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THE JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF LIBERAL STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION: IS ARTICLE 10, SECTION 8 LOST
AND FORGOTTEN?
CHARLES A. BECKHAM, JR.

The Texas Supreme Court's position that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed' recently has come under increasing criticism from the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals.2 The supreme
court has based its position upon a long line of cases adopting the timehonored canon of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed.' In support of its view, the Fort
Worth Court of Civil Appeals has pointed to an act of the legislature passed
over ninety years ago which expressly abrogated the canon of strict construction.' As it reads today, article 10, section 8 of the civil statutes states:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof shall be
strictly construed shall have no application to the Revised Statutes; but the
said statutes shall constitute the law of this State respecting the subjects to
which they relate; and the provisions thereof shall be liberally construed with
a view to effect their objects and to promote justice. 5

Arguably, a plain reading of the statute makes it clear that the legislature
intended a liberal construction of its statutes, but since its enactment,
article 10, section 8 has fallen prey to judicial avoidance and preference
for the common law rule of strict construction.'
1. See, e.g., Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex. 1974); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967); Coastal States Gas
Producing Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171, 175, 309 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1958).
2. See, e.g., Welborn v. Woolfolk, 560 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977, no writ); Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 554 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977).
3. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Grant, 143 Tex. 145, 152, 182 S.W.2d 996,1000 (1944); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 125 Tex. 430, 441, 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1935); City of Waco v.
Roberts, 121 Tex. 217, 224, 48 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1932).
4. See cases note 2 supra. These cases cite to article 10, section 8, which is the current
version of Tex. Civ. Stat. Final Title § 3 (1879).
5. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 8 (Vernon 1969). For purposes of this comment,
references to article 10, section 8 will include references to all prior codifications of the statute,
beginning with Tex. Civ. Stat. Final Title § 3 (1879).
6. See, e.g., Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex. 1974); Johnson v.
Darr, 114 Tex. 516, 520, 272 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1925); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v.
Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 325, 137 S.W. 1120, 1123 (1911). But see Pittman v. Time Sec., 301
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, no writ); Sugg v. Smith, 205 S.W. 363,
373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, writ refd); International & G.N.R. Co. v. Boles, 161 S.W.
914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1913, writ ref'd).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 9

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10: 163

APPLICATION OF CANON OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION

At the outset, it must be noted that all statutes by their very nature are
in derogation of the common law either directly or by entering an area
previously free of common law regulation The doctrine of strict construction amounts only to the recognition of a presumption against any change
in the common law.8 According to one commentator, "it assumes that
legislation is something to be deprecated." 9 Article 10, section 8 directs an
extension of the statutory law through liberal construction of all statutes,
an extension which is clearly antagonistic to the common law and the
common law rule of strict construction.
The dissimilarity between a liberal and a strict construction can amount
to a great difference in statutory application. A liberal construction expands the statute's purview to encompass more situations and circumstances."0 A strict construction limits the application of the statute to only
those circumstances encompassed by a narrow reading of the language
used." Accordingly, the problem of statutory construction is that contrary
results may be reached in similar fact situations depending on whether the
construction is liberal or strict.
HistoricalBackground
The problem of assigning the intended meaning to the words of legislative enactments relates back several centuries to the early English common
law.' 2 Although the earliest of English statutes enjoyed a liberal construc7. Horack, The Disintegrationof Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 345 (1949);
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 387 (1908).
8. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 17 (1904).
9. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 387 (1908).
10. See Industrial Accident Bd. v. Miears, 227 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Smith, 40 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, no writ); 2AJ. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON § 58.02, at 464 (4th ed. 1973).
11. Christman v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 157 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); see
Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379, 381-84 (1907).
12. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584). In that case, Lord Coke
reported some of the first rules of statutory construction:
[Tihat for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be discerned
and considered:1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
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tion,'2 by 1610 Lord Coke announced in Bonham's Case" that the common
law would prevail over any act of Parliament repugnant to common right
and reason, and that any such parliamentary act would be adjudged void.' 5
By 1688, with the establishment of parliamentary supremacy, this policy
had lost its vitality, yet the interpretation of statutes remained in the
courts, and the judicial distaste for statutes in derogation of common right
found itself in the restrictive interpretation of the statutes of that day.'"
The English view was recognized early by American ,courts when the
United States Supreme Court followed the doctrine in 1797.1 By 1855, the
Texas Supreme Court had adopted the rule in the early case of DeWitt v.
Dunn,'" stating that the rule of strict construction was imperative where
the pertinent statute inflicted onerous and oppressive penalties.'"
Determining why the canon has remained viable up to the present day
despite the provisions of article 10, section 8 is a matter of conjecture.
Certainly the doctrine of stare decisis has played an important role in the
continuation of the rule.20 Additionally, some commentators have suggested that the common law is the perfection of human reason and therefore is superior to any statutory law.' Associated with this contention is
the idea that the common law is a better quality of law; being distilled
from experience, it embodies broad principles of a durable quality as distinguished from statutes, which are rules devised merely to cope with
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
Id. at 638 (footnotes of the court deleted).
13. II J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 325, at 630 (2d ed. 1904).
The liberal construction was attributable to the brevity and lack of clarity in the statutes.
The earliest of these English statutes were enacted in Latin and French prior to the reign of
Edward III, which began in 1327. Judges devised them from the petitions and the King's
answer; all those adopted at one session of Parliament were compiled to make so many
chapters of one statute. Id. at 629-30.
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
15. Id. at 652.
16. One of the reasons the preference for strict construction arose is found in F. POLLACK,
ESSAY IN JUISPRUDENCE AND ETHIcS

85 (1882), where the author states: "Some of its rules

cannot well be accounted for except on a theory that Parliament generally changes the law
for the worse, and that the business of judges is to keep the mischief of its interference within
the narrowest bounds." Id. at 85. See generally Fordham & Leach, Interpretationof Statutes
in Derogationof the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 438, 440-41 (1950).
17. See Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797).
18. 15 Tex. 106 (1855).
19. Id. at 108. Despite the adoption of the doctrine of strict construction in this case,
the court did not find it necessary to apply it to the statute involved. Id. at 108.
20. See James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1973); Hanson
Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358, 366 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1959, no writ).
21. See Fordham & Leach, Interpretationof Statutes in Derogationof the Common Law,
3 VAND. L. Rev. 438, 441 (1950). But see Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L.
REv. 383, 404-06 (1908) (legislation truer foundation of common will).
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problems as they might appear." Regardless of the reason for its continued
force, the canon has had a marked effect upon statutory construction in
Texas despite contrary statutory law."
Remedial Statutes
Adherence to the strict construction canon has not been rigid, for Texas
courts have selectively followed the liberal construction mandate of article
10, section 8.24 Many courts dealing with a statute remedial in nature have
rendered a more liberal construction and have seemed more inclined to
follow article 10, section 8.25 Courts in such cases have justified the use of
a liberal construction as necessary for the full accomplishment of the remedial purposes for which the statutes involved were enacted."
Classic examples of remedial statutes are the workmen's compensation
laws. 7 Such laws are in derogation of the common law in that they have
created new liabilities without reference to the negligent conduct of the
party upon whom the burden of compensation is cast. 8 Despite this classification, they have been considered remedial in nature and therefore have
been liberally construed by many courts." Justification for the liberal con22. Fordham & Leach, Interpretationof Statutes in Derogationof the Common Law, 3
VAND. L. Rav. 438, 442 (1950).
23. See Johnson, Article 2226 Revisited: Penetrating the Judicial Labyrinth, 40 TEx.
B.J. 395, 396 (1977).
24. Compare Toyah Independent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School
Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ) (liberally construing
open meetings law) with Ridout v. Mobile Hous., Inc., 497 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (strictly construing attorney's fees statute).
25. See, e.g., Joaquin Independent School Dist. v. Fincher, 510 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (school district consolidation statute); Toyah Independent
School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ) (open meetings law); Hime v. City of Galveston, 268
S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (civil service sick leave statute). A statute which affords a remedy or facilitates remedies already existing for the redress
of injuries is said to be remedial in nature. See United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan
Plumbing Co., 363 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, no writ).
26. City of Mason v. Went Texas Utils. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 29, 237 S.W.2d 273, 280 (1951);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Parker Bros. & Co., 437 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. See Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 444, 341 S.W.2d 154, 158 (1960); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 164, 196 S.W.2d 390, 394 (1946).
28. McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1075 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1924, writ ref'd).
29. See, e.g., Huffman v. Southern Underwriters, 133 Tex. 354. 359, 128 S.W.2d 4, 6
(1939); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cummings, 364 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Industrial Accident Bd. v. Parker, 348 S.W.2d 188, 191
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960, writ refd n.r.e.). But see Poe v. Continental Oil & Cotton
Co., 231 S.W. 717, 720 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgmt adopted) (Workmen's Compensation
Act deprives citizens of common law right and should be strictly construed); Silurian Oil Co.
v. White, 252 S.W. 569, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, writ refd) (strictly construing
law in derogation of common law right).
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struction in such cases has been the view that these acts are highly responsive to important social and economic needs by providing a speedier and
more efficient method of settling the claims of employees against their
employers. 0
Other cases involving the public welfare have prompted Texas courts to
view the statutes concerned as remedial in nature, thus enabling a liberal
construction. Some of these cases have involved the open meetings law, 3
a civil service statute, 2 a school district consolidation statute,33 a statute
defining libel defenses, 4 an appeal bond statute, 5 and a mechanic's lien
statute.
Although they cannot be considered strictly remedial, election statutes
have generally been afforded a liberal construction. 7 When faced with the
problem of construing an election statute, the Amarillo Court of Civil
Appeals in 1947 held strongly in favor of a liberal construction.3 8 It emphatically announced that statutory provisions concerning public functions
which the law had committed to the people, such as general and special
elections, should always be liberally construed so as to effectuate the will
of the people. To those ends, irregularities in the following of election
procedure have been found immaterial where the public mandate was not
defeated."
30. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 164, 196 S.W.2d 390, 394
(1946). See generally Horovitz, Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensation, 21 IND. L.J. 473
(1946).
31. Toyah Indpendent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School Dist., 466
S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ) (assurance of public information concerning public business transactions).
32. Hime v. City of Galveston, 268 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (liberal construction allowed accumulated sick leave benefits to survive employee's death).
33. Joaquin Independent School Dist. v. Fincher, 510 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (liberally construing to allow consolidation).
34. Taylor v. Iowa Park Gin Co., 199 S.W. 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917,
no writ) (liberally construing to extend defenses).
35. Ezell v. Knapp & Elliott, 120 Tex. 503, 507, 39 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1931) (Comm'n App.
decision) (appeal bond held applicable to appeal from justice court to county court).
36. William Cameron & Co. v. Trueheart, 165 S.W. 58, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914,
no writ) (statute liberally construed to secure wages for mechanics and materialmen).
37. E.g., Grizzaffi v. Lee, 517 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ
dism'd); Little v. Alto Independent School Dist., 513 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1974, writ dism'd); Britten v. Williams, 293 S.W.2d 853, 855-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Pollard v. Snodgrass, 203 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, writ
dism'd).
39. Id. at 644. As a corollary, the court stated that election statutes should be strictly
enforced to prevent fraud, but liberally construed to effectuate the will of the voters. Id. at
644.
40. See Little v. Alto Independent School Dist., 513 S.W.2d 886, 890-91 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd).
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The public will and welfare, therefore, seem to have been decisive factors
for consideration in determining whether a statute is remedial. Guided by
such principles of public policy, the courts, in order to perpetuate the
beneficial purposes of remedial statutes, have granted and probably will
continue to grant such statutes a liberal construction.
Penal Statutes
When dealing with a statute penal in nature, Texas courts have rendered
more restrictive interpretations than when dealing with remedial statutes.4" Penal legislation, like most other statutes, is in derogation of the
common law and generally has been strictly construed.42 Texas courts have
strictly construed penal statutes in order to provide reasonable certainty
regarding exactly what conduct the statute proscribes.43
A statute that is enforceable by fine, imprisonment, or other punishment
is a penal statute." The penal character, however, does not depend upon
the use of any narrowly limited class of methods by which punishment is
administered.45 Rather, it depends upon some sanction in the statute that
compels obedience beyond mere redress to an individual or society for the
injury received. 6
41. E.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Padre Drilling Co., 453 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. 1970); Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Ridout v. Mobile Hous., Inc., 497
S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although the Penal Code is
certainly a p~nal statute, the term "penal statute" is not restricted tothose provisions found
in the Penal Code.
42. See Hall, Strict or Liberal Constructionof Penal Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REV. 748, 74950 (1935). Although closely related to the canon of strict construction of statutes in derogation
of the common law, the canon of strict construction of penal statutes has a different history.
It arose in 14th century England out of the "benefit of clergy"-the freedom from the usual
death penalty for common law felonies. The benefit of clergy was claimed through a literacy
test, and with the increase of successful claimants during the 15th century, a number of
statutes abolishing the benefit of clergy in specified crimes were passed. Henry VIII passed
several more statutes to exclude certain other felons from being eligible to claim the benefit
of clergy. To combat this every increasing criminal liability, the canon of strict construction
of penal statutes began. Id. at 749-50.
43. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 424, 100 S.W. 766, 767 (1907); Ex
parte Leslie, 87 Tex. Crim. 476, 478, 223 S.W. 227, 228 (1920) (following Texas Supreme Court
construction).

44. 3 J.

SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 59.01, at 1 (1974); see

Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. 197, 210 (1845); City of San Marcos v. Lower Colorado River
Auth., 508 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), modified, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.
1975).

45. See Bowles v. Angelo, 188 S.W.2d 691, 693-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1945, no
writ) (wartime Emergency Price Control Act).
46. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 424, 100 S.W. 766, 767 (1907)
(weekly penalty for railroad's failure to erect statutorily prescribed water-closets at all
stations); cf. Schild v. Busch, 293 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (penalties imposed

for planting in excess of acreage allotment under Agricultural Adjustment Act); United States
v. Four Hundred & Twenty Dollars, 162 F. 803, 805 (S.D. Ala. 1908) (statute regulating
immigration of aliens).
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Article 2226 of the civil statutes,47 which authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees in cases coming within its scope, has usually been found to be
penal in character. 8 Texas courts, continually finding it to be in derogation
of the common law and penal in nature, have felt compelled to render a
strict construction when applying it."9 In most of those cases, the courts
have relied primarily upon the precept of stare decisis, with little more
than a restatement of the canon of strict construction itself as the reason
for strictly construing article 2226.50 A few courts, when dealing with article
2226, have not so complacently permitted stare decisis to displace what is
probably the more well-reasoned approach. In those instances, the courts
have rendered a more liberal construction, in each case relying on the
provisions of article 10, section 8.11
Oddly enough, the Penal Code, which of course is penal in nature, has
an early history of liberal construction. 2 This tradition perhaps is attributable to the fact that since 1856 the penal code has contained a provision
subverting the canon of strict construction. 3 Although not always strictly
adhering to this legislative directive, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
appears to have been more dutiful in following the Penal Code's construction article than the supreme court in following article 10, section 8.11
47. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
48. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Padre Drilling Co., 453 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. 1970); Van
Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962); Burke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, no writ). Suits
within the scope of article 2226 are generally those for services rendered, labor performed, or
material furnished. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
49. See, e.g., Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex. 1974); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967); Davidson v.
Suber, 553 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
50. See Ridout v. Mobile Hous., Inc., 497 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5, 10 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Success Motivation Inst., Inc. v. Jamieson Film Co.,
473 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Hudgens, 412 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Welborn v. Woolfolk, 560 S.W.2d 189, 190-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no
writ); Wyche v. Wichita Eng'r Co., 374 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no
writ).
52. State v. Elliot, 34 Tex. 148, 150 (1870-71); The Road Cases, 30 Tex. 503, 505 (1867).
In liberally construing the penal code, the court in Elliot said that the reason behind the rule
of strict construction had become obsolete or had never existed in Texas. State v. Elliot, 34
Tex. 148, 150 (1870-71).
53. Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, 1 Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. 26 (Vernon
1974). As the statute reads today, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05 (Vernon 1974) states: "The
rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this code. The provisions
of this code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice
and effect the objectives of the code."
54. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 538 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ramirez v.
State, 518 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). But see Linley v. State, 501 S.W.2d 121,
123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (strictly construing penal statute).
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Arguably, the reverse of this situation would seem more likely when it is
considered that too liberal a construction of the Penal Code could lead to
unconstitutional vagueness.5 Nonetheless, a similar provision calling for
abolition of the common law rule of strict construction was included in the
1974 Penal Code, and since that time the court of criminal appeals has
complied with it."
Since article 10, section 8 of the civil statutes and section 1.05 of the
Penal Code are substantially similar in their apparent intent, a conclusion
as to why the court of criminal appeals has chosen to follow section 1.05
of the Penal Code while the supreme court has largely ignored article 10,
section 8 would be speculative. Perhaps the courts' divergent paths can be
attributed to disagreement among the civil courts of Texas as to whether
a liberal or a strict construction is proper. With so many civil courts, the
canon of strict construction gained early, broad support in both appellate
levels,57 and article 10, section 8 may well have been forgotten as soon as
it was enacted. The supreme court also afforded itself a degree of flexibility
in not applying article 10, section 8. In the criminal courts, however, the
legislative directive was quickly adopted by the court of criminal appeals
and has been followed to this day."
Statutes Both Penal and Remedial
Some statutes, because of the provisions they contain, are considered to
be both penal and remedial in nature. Such would be the case where a
statute introduces new regulations for the protection of public welfare and
also imposes penalties to deter their violation. 9 Because the traditional
distinctions are unclear, courts dealing with such statutes have become
perplexed as whether to render a liberal or a strict construction. Some
courts have ignored the remedial benefits that the statute may contain by
focusing on only the penal provisions, and therefore have strictly construed
the statute.'" Conversely, a liberal construction has been rendered when
55. See Passmore v. State, 544 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Powell v.State,
538 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HAiv. L. REv. 748, 756-68 (1935).
56. See Powell v. State, 538 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ramirez v. State,
518 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
57. See Schloss v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 85 Tex. 601, 604, 22 S.W. 1014, 1015 (1893);
DeWitt v. Dunn, 15 Tex. 106, 108 (1855); Texas & P.R. Co. v. Wood, 23 S.W. 744, 745 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
58. Powell v. State, 538 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Oliver v. State, 65 Tex.
Crim. 150, 165, 144 S.W. 604, 612 (1911).
59. Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 266, 239 S.W.2d 803,
808-09 (1951).
60. See Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Carney v. Sam
Houston Underwriters, 272 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
But see Howard v. Simons, 285 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (liberally construing remedial provisions while strictly construing penal provisions).
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only the remedial purposes of the statute have been considered.' Still
another view has separated the penal portions from those that are remedial
and given the penal provisions a strict construction and the remainder of
the statute a broader, more liberal interpretation." In light of such important, consumer-oriented legislation as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act 3 (DTPA) and the Texas Consumer Credit
Code, 4 both of which contain remedial as well as penal provisions, the
problem of statutory construction becomes increasingly important.
The DTPA has received a mixed interpretation from the Texas judiciary. "5 At least a few courts, possibly recognizing only its penal provisions,
have accorded the Act a strict construction; 6 other courts, in opposition,
have argued for liberal construction. 7 The Texas Supreme Court settled
the controversy, however, in Woods v. Littleton.6" In requiring a liberal
construction, the Woods court looked to section 17.44, which calls for a
liberal construction of the entire Act. 6 This liberal construction is certainly
consistent with the legislative intent of providing effective relief for the
aggrieved consumer. 0
Comparison of the application of article 10, section 8 with section 17.44
of the DTPA is instructive. The directive of liberal construction of the
DTPA is in accord with the provisions of article 10, section 8. It is interesting to note that the supreme court has readily chosen to follow section
17.44 of the DTPA after so many years of ignoring similar provisions con61. See McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ).
62. Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 266, 239 S.W.2d 803,
809 (1951).
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
64. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1978).
65. Compare Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977, writ granted) (construing act strictly to mean that "may" does not mean "mandatory")
with Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ) (construing act liberally to allow for recovery of attorney's fees on appeal).
66. See Mallory v. Custer, 537 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ);
Cape Conroe Ltd. v. Specht, 525 S.W.2d 215, 218-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ). See generally Comment, Breach of Warranty and Treble Damages
Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
395, 398 (1976).
67. See McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ); Doyle v. Grady, 543 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ);
Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975,
no writ). See generally Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act: Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 763, 764-65 (1977).
68. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
69. Id. at 667-69. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1978) states: "This
subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
70. McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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tained in article 10, section 8. To hold otherwise, however, would render
ineffective the tools supplied the wronged consumer in seeking redress from
unscrupulous sellers.7' Seemingly, the only differences between the provision of section 17.44 and the similar directives of article 10, section 8 are
the newness of 17.44, and the restrictive purposes for which it can be
applied."2 Unlike the broad application that article 10, section 8 could have
if fully and effectively applied, section 17.44 applies only to the DTPA and
the supreme court can exercise 17.44 without fear of losing the flexibility
it enjoys in construing the many diversified statutes.
Another consumer legislation statute, the Texas Consumer Credit Code,
has thrown Texas courts attempting to interpret it into a quagmire. 3 Because it contains penalties for various violations, some courts have found
the Consumer Credit Code to be penal in nature and therefore, have
strictly construed it.74 Other courts, however, have looked beyond the penal
character of the statute toward the legislative intent to protect the consumer.75 This intent has been viewed as remedial, and, consequently, more
courts have been willing to render a liberal construction."
The remedial characterization of the statute has given rise to an interesting anomaly. In order to reach a liberal construction to further the Code's
remedial purposes a court may have to read the statute rigidly to find a
violation." A rigid reading may be acceptable, however, in view of the clear

71. Id. at 396.
72. Section 17.44 specifically applies to the subchapter comprising the DTPA. TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
73. Compare Pinemont Bank v. DuCroz, 528 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (usury statute penal in nature and to be strictly construed) with Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd
perSee
curiam, 554 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977) (usury statute liberally construed).
n.r.e.74.
Hight v. Jim Bass Ford, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977,
(Tex. Civ. App.348,
354
S.W.2d
writ ref d nr.e.); Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 534
Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 100-01 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978). In modifying
the Miller decision the supreme court totally ignored article 10, section 8 in holding that the
Consumer Credit Code was to be strictly construed. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d
571, 577 (Tex. 1978).
76. See O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973) (federal consumer credit legislation).
77. See Chavez v. Aetna Fin. Co., 553 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 561 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1978); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l
Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Still another paradoxical situation arose where a court found that there had been an insignificant usurious
charge. In Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 151, 152-53 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) the court found that the defendant had charged interest in
the amount of forty-two cents over the maximum permitted under the usury statute, but did
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legislative intent that the Consumer Credit Code be granted a liberal construction in order to fulfill its remedial purposes."8 Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court in Southwestern Investment Co. v. Mannix" recently viewed
the remedial purposes as controlling in liberally construing the statute.
Only a few months later, however, the court reached a contrary result in
First State Bank v. Miller.8 Without mention of Mannix, the court concerned itself with the penal nature of the Code and determined that a strict
construction was necessary.82 The only distinction between the two cases
was the different provisions of the Code involved and the differing line of
support relied upon in each case. Mannix involved a disclosure violation
under the Code and the supreme court relied notably upon the legislative
intent in rendering a liberal construction." Dealing with a usury violation
under the Code, Miller found the provisions of the Code to be penal and
quickly deemed a strict construction to be appropriate. 4 A strong dissent
in the Miller case, however, turned to the legislative intent of the Consumer Credit Code and persuasively argued for an apparent liberal construction, and one certainly in agreement with the construction rendered
in Mannix.85 This position is also in accord with several other recent cases"
and would seem to be the only way to guard the consumer from unscrupulous and predatory trade practices.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 10, SECTION 8

Many Texas courts have justified strict construction by finding a statute
not allow recovery. Id. at 153. Whether this interpretation constitutes a liberal or strict
construction presents an interesting contradiction in terms. It cannot be a liberal construction
because it restricts, rather than extends, the applicability of the statute. Nor can it be a strict
construction as it did not grant recovery for a clear violation of the statute. Such interpretation is in accord, however, with the doctrine of "de minimis non curat lex," which means that
the law takes no notice of trifles.
78. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 1-2 (Vernon
1971).
79. 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
80. Id. at 768-69.
81. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
82. Id. at 577.
83. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex. 1977).
84. First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
85. Id. at 579-80. It is interesting to note that in the opinions of both the majority and
the dissent no mention was made of article 10, section 8, although its influence was prominent
in the opinion filed by the court of civil appeals. The dissent certainly could have supported
its position by its use but chose not to, presumably so that the court as a whole could maintain
flexibility in future statutory construction cases.
86. See Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
no writ). But see Crow v. Home Sav. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Tex. 1975) (strictly construing statute to find no violation).
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to be in derogation of the common law or penal in nature." As the court
in O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell88 pointed but, however, none of the
construction mandates which are embodied in article 10 even attempt to
infer a requirement of strict construction."9 Only section 8 of article 10
speaks of strict construction, and it expressly commands that the common
law rule of strict construction "shall have no application" and further
directs that statutes "shall be liberally construed with a view to effect their
objects .

. . ."0 Texas

courts have not embraced article 10, section 8 and

the inescapable conclusion is that most have judicially avoided the statute." In fact, although the supreme court has liberally construed many
remedial statutes, the court has never effectively applied article 10, section
8 as a basis for liberally construing any statute.2 Moreover, the supreme
court and the courts of civil appeals have steadfastly adhered to the canon
of strict construction except in cases involving statutes they have deemed
remedial.
Strict Compliance vs. Strict Construction
More cautious courts have on occasion employed other means to avoid
the liberal construction mandate of article 10, section 8. While labelling
their action as in accordance with the liberal construction requirement,
they have at the same time inappropriately extended the doctrine of strict
compliance as a substitute for otherwise impermissible strict construction,9 Strict compliance is often demanded in cases dealing with statutes
in derogation of the common law where the courts have acknowledged that
87. See, e.g., Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex. 1974); Tenneco
Oil Co. v. Padre Drilling Co., 453 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. 1970); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967).
88. 528 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 860.
90. T.x. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 8 (Vernon 1969).
91. This avoidance does not appear unusual, however, as some courts in other states that
have similar statutes likewise refuse to follow them. R. DiCKERsON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLiCATION OF STATUTES 269-70 (1975).
92. See Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 166, 171, 221 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1949)
(court suggests interpretation of statute in light of the common law, which statute expressly
abrogates); Massachusetts v. United N. & S. Dev. Co., 140 Tex. 417, 420-21, 168 S.W.2d
226, 228-29 (1942) (sets aside argument of liberal construction if additional application is
not completely obvious); Smith v. Wortham, 106 Tex. 106, 111, 157 S.W. 740, 742 (1913)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) (arguing for liberal construction pursuant to article 10, section 8);
Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 325, 137 S.W. 1120, 1123 (1911)
(prefers rule of "fair construction" over legislative rule of liberal construction). But see
Ezell v. Knapp & Elliot, 120 Tex. 503, 507, 39 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1931) (Comm'n App. decision)
(properly applying article 10, section 8); Seley v. Howell, 115 Tex. 583, 589, 285 S.W. 815,
817 (1926) (Comm'n App. decision) (properly applying article 10, section 8).
93. See Toyah Independent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School Dist., 466
S.W.2d 377, 379 n.5 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ).
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such statutes are to be liberally construed." Liberal construction is given
to arrive at the legislative intent with a view to effect the object and
purpose of the enactment." Strict compliance, however, is demanded to
assure that those seeking to avail themselves of the benefit of a statute
comply strictly with its terms," and is a doctrine well settled in Texas
courts."
The demand for strict compliance has led some courts to take advantage of the similarity between impermissible strict construction and acceptable strict compliance." By disguising strict construction as mere acquiescence to the requirement of strict compliance, the requirement of
liberal construction can be circumvented." An example of such tactic was
the narrow interpretation of to whom the guest statute should apply in
Hickman v. Finlay.'0 The court in that case found the automobile guest
statute to be in derogation of the common law, yet recognized that the
canon of strict construction no longer applied to such statutes.'' To avoid
having to construe the statute liberally, the court, in the name of strict
0
In
compliance, narrowly construed who was a guest under the statute.1
effect, the court said it would give a liberal construction to a statute the
scope of which it had restricted according to its own narrow interpretation.
Closely scrutinized, such an approach appears to be no more than avoidance of the spirit, if not also the letter, of article 10, section 8.
Judicial Evasion
In avoiding the application of article 10, section 8, many courts have
dispensed with semantic subtleties in order to render a strict construction.
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac
Construction Co., ' construing the recovery of attorney's fees under article
2226, admitted that many courts had overlooked the provisions of article
94. See Hickman v. Finlay, 392 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ
ref'd); Gregory v. Otts, 329 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ refd
n.r.e.)'.
95. Smith v. Texas Co., 53 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
96. Id. at 776.
97. See Buerger v. Wells, 110 Tex. 566, 567, 222 S.W. 151, 151 (1920); Scurlock &
Rutledge v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 77 Tex. 478, 481, 14 S.W. 148, 148 (1890).
98. Hickman v. Finlay, 392 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd);
Gregory v. Otts, 329 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. Hickman v. Finlay, 392 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd);
Gregory v. Otts, 329 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. 392 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd).
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 149. In Hickman, the court determined that a cousin entering a car for a ride
home from a family reunion was not a guest, thereby denying automobile driver benefits of
the guest statute. Id. at 149.
103. 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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10, section 8 when strictly construing article 2226.104 Acknowledging that
article 2226 should receive a liberal construction pursuant to the provisions
of article 10, section 8, the court blithely proceeded to render a strict
construction, "'' justifying its result on the basis of prior supreme court
decisions.' 0
In defense of this reasoning by the Hanson court, it should be noted that
the principle of stare decisis is particularly applicable in matters of statutory construction.' 7 Courts generally have adhered to an established construction on the theory that if a previous statutory construction had been
improper, the legislature would have responded by amending the statute
to clarify its intended meaning. 0 It can hardly be said, however, that this
argument alone should provide support for totally ignoring article 10, section 8, particularly when the court itself, after a plain reading of the section, admitted that the previous constructions had been erroneous.'00
Interestingly, the supreme court has not completely ignored article 10,
section 8.110 In 1969 it allowed that the rule of strict construction should
not be followed, but quickly receded by also recognizing a rule that a
statute creating liability unknown to the common law must be strictly
construed not to extend beyond its plain meaning.'' Again, such words are
but judicial evasion of article 10, section 8. As the court in O.R. Mitchell
104. Id. at 724.
105. Id. at 724. In acknowledging that a liberal construction of article 2226 would be
proper, the court cited to Johnson, Article 2226 Revisited: Penetrating the JudicialLabyrinth, 40 TEX. B.J. 395 (1977). In the article, the author strongly argued that article 2226
should receive a liberal construction pursuant to article 10, section 8. Id. at 396, 398.
106. Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 724 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The case cited as controlling was Tenneco Oil Co. v.
Padre Drilling Co., 453 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1970). Tenneco has been frequently cited as controlling when applying a strict construction to the statute involved. See Hight v. Jim Bass Ford,
Inc., 552 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Consumer Credit
Code); Ridout v. Mobile Hous., Inc., 497 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney's fees statute).
107. James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1973); Marmon
v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. 1968).
108. See United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U.S. 771, 774-75 (1948); Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. 1968).
109. See Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 724 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110. See Smith v. Wortham, 106 Tex. 106, 111, 157 S.W. 740, 742 (1913) (dissenting
opinion) (liberal construction mandated by article 10, section 8); Farmers' & Mechanics'
Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 325, 137 S.W. 1120, 1123 (1911) (preferring a fair construction over a liberal construction).
111. Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1969). Although it must be
admitted that the court's construction of the guest statute in Satterfield was completely
reasonable, use of the Satterfield language resulted in a strict construction in at least one
other somewhat dissimilar case. See Cafeterias, Inc. v. System-Master, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 253,
256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ).
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Motors, Inc. v. Bell"' pointed out, nothing in article 10 speaks favorably
of strict construction." 3
JudicialLegislation
In pointing out the reluctance of Texas courts to apply article 10, section
8, it must be questioned whether the courts have legislated excessively in
avoiding its use. It has been suggested that judicial legislation is completely proper and often unavoidable."' In many instances that may be
true, and there may perhaps be no reasonable objection to judicial legislation so long as the function is exercised in accordance with the constitutional safeguards intended to prevent abuse of discretion."' Conversely, it
may be argued that the legislature has the primary function of lawmaking
and that the courts ought to leave that responsibility to it,"' especially
where a plain reading of a statute such as article 10, section 8 can yield
only one meaning.
The Texas Supreme Court, in addressing the question of judicial legislation through statutory construction, has ruled that it is the duty of the
court to administer the law as it is written and not to make law." 7 That
concept would seem to embody a strong distaste for judicial legislation.
Ironically, the judicial evasion of article 10, section 8 is suggestive of judicial legislation. It is equivalent to a total disregard of a legislative enactment, and only adds confusion as to who makes the laws and what each
particular statute's scope is. A sounder approach would be found in fully
applying article 10, section 8, as some recent decisions have done," 8 so as
to fully effectuate the section's underlying legislative intent.
CONCLUSION

The explanation of the supreme court's long-standing avoidance of article 10, section 8 would be only conjecture. The legislature intended all of
its legislation to be liberally construed and not to allow the courts the
flexibility of strictly or liberally construing statutes as the courts might
112. 528 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. Id. at 859-60.
114. See Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1944), aff'd sub norn., Gemsco,
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
115. See Lenhoff, Extra-LegislationalProgressof Law: The Place of the Judiciaryin the
Shaping of New Law, 28 NEB. L. REV. 542, 549 (1949).
116. See Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744, 746-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
117. See Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131 Tex. 449, 456, 116 S.W.2d 675, 678 (1938);
Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 325, 137 S.W. 1120, 1123 (1911).
118. Welborn v. Woolfolk, 560 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no
writ); see Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e.
per curiam, 554 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977).
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deem appropriate in each case."' Perhaps the supreme court sees this
directive as an invasion into its province by the legislature. Certainly, the
possible repercussions that compliance with article 10, section 8 could have
would be vast, for it would restrict the range for judicial interpretation of
all the civil statutes.
The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals has taken a prudent step toward
fulfilling the legislative directives of article 10, section 8 and one that
should be followed. Although the Fort Worth court has relinquished the
flexibility it had prior to its recognition of the validity of article 10, section
8, it grants to the laws of Texas a proper application, and one which is
consistent with the intent of the legislature.
119. See TEX.

REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 10, § 8 (Vernon 1969).
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